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MONTANA'S REAL PROPERTY FORFEITURE




Forfeiture has become one of the prosecutor's most effective
weapons in the attack on illegal narcotics sales and other organized
criminal activity. Forfeiture, along with undercover operations and
electronic surveillance, is the latest weapon available to the gov-
ernment in the attack on organized crime and narcotics
syndicates.1
The Montana drug forfeiture statute,2 is closely modeled after
B.A., Washington State University, 1973; M.B.A., Gonzaga University, 1978; J.D.,
Gonzaga University, 1978; Jack Nevin is currently a Deputy Prosecuting Attorney at the
Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney's office, Tacoma, Washington. He has been an Adjunct
Professor at the University of Puget Sound Law School and at Pierce College at Fort Stei-
lacoom. The author expresses special appreciation to legal assistants Marcia Bauer and Pat
Macaluso for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Kelly McClure, Federal Civil Forfeiture of Assets: Why it Works and How it Must,
11 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 419, 420-23 (1991) (symposium on forfeiture under state and fed-
eral statutes); Robert P. Brouillard, Civil Forfeiture Law in Oregon: Efforts Toward Effec-
tive and Equitable Change, 25 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 455, 456-57 (1989).
2. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 44-12-101 to -206 (1991). Section 44-12-102 provides that the
following are subject to forfeiture:
(a) all controlled substances that have been manufactured, distributed, prepared,
cultivated, compounded, processed, or possessed in violation of Title 45, Chapter
9;
(b) all money, raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind that are used
or intended for use in manufacturing, preparing, cultivating, compounding,
processing, delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled substances in viola-
tion of Title 45, Chapter 9, except items used or intended for use in connection
with quantities of marijuana in amounts less than 60 grams;
(c) except as provided in subsection (2)(d), all property that is used or intended
for use as a container for anything enumerated in subsection (1)(a) of (1)(b);
(d) except as provided in subsection (2), all conveyances, including aircraft, vehi-
cles, and vessels, that are used or intended for use in any manner to facilitate the
commission of a violation of Title 45, Chapter 9;
(e) all books, records, and research products and materials, including formulas,
microfilm, tapes, and data, that are used or intended for use in violation of Title
45, Chapter 9;
(f) all drug paraphernalia as defined in 45-10-101;
(g) everything of value furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a
controlled substance in violation of Title 45, Chapter 9; all proceeds traceable to
such an exchange; and all money, negotiable instruments, and securities used or
intended to be used to facilitate a violation of Title 45, Chapter 9;
(h) any personal property constituting or derived from proceeds obtained directly
or indirectly from a violation of Title 45, Chapter 9, that is punishable by more
than 5 years in prison; and
1
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the federal drug forfeiture statute.' Section 102(1)(i) of the Mon-
tana forfeiture statute allows for the seizure of real estate used to
grow or process controlled substances. The procedures allowed
under this statutory scheme are the same as those followed under
the federal statute and provide for the seizure of real estate with-
out preseizure notice to the land owner." Litigants should look to
(i) real property, including any right, title, and interest in any lot or tract of land
and any appurtenances or improvements, that is directly used or intended to be
used in any manner or part to commit or facilitate the commission of or that is
derived from or maintained by the proceeds resulting from a violation of Title 45,
Chapter 9, that is punishable by more than 5 years in prison. An owner's interest
in real property is not subject to forfeit by reason of any act or omission unless it
is proved that the act or omission was the owner's or was with his actual knowl-
edge or express consent....
3. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988). This statute provides:
(a) SUBJECT PROPERTY.
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property
right shall exist in them:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dis-
pensed, or acquired in violation of this subchapter.
(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are used, or
intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, import-
ing, or exporting any controlled substance in violation of this subchapter.
(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for property
described in paragraph (1), (2) or (9).
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation,
sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1),
(2), or (9). ...
(5) All books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data
which are used, or intended for use, in violation of this subchapter.
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value fur-
nished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled
substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an ex-
change, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to
be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter, except that no property shall
be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by
reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed
or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including leasehold
interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or im-
provements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to com-
mit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable
by more that one year imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited
under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any
act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted
without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(1)-(7) (1988).
4. MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-12-103(2) (1991). Section 103(2) provides that "all property
subject to forfeiture under 44-12-102 may be seized by a peace officer under a search war-
rant issued by a district court having jurisdiction over the property .... Similarly, 21 U.S.C
§ 881(b) provides that "[t]he government may request the issuance of a warrant authorizing
the seizure of property subject to forfeiture under this section in the same manner as pro-
2
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REAL PROPERTY FORFEITURE STATUTE
federal cases for guidance when interpreting section 102(1)(i) be-
cause it is similar to the federal statute and Montana lacks
precedent.'
A large body of federal authority holds that federal real prop-
erty forfeiture statutes are unconstitutional as applied, because no
preseizure notice is given to landowners before their land is seized.'
Since the federal and Montana statutes are similar, the abundance
of authority indicates that Montana's Real Property Forfeiture
statute is unconstitutional.
Throughout Montana there are no doubt landowners who are
using their property to grow or otherwise process controlled sub-
stances.7 These landowners run the risk of losing their land as a
result of a forfeiture statute that may be unconstitutional in its
application. Arguably, attorneys representing these landowners will
have a good argument to defeat these seizures.
This article explores the constitutional issues raised by section
44-12-102(1)(i) of the Montana Code. The first section provides an
overview of civil forfeiture and compares Title 44, Chapter 12 to 21
U.S.C. § 881. The second section explores the rationale behind the
holding in the landmark case of United States v. Premises and
Real Property at 4492 South Livonia Road' and its reliance on the
case of Fuentes v. Shevin.9 Section three examines how other fed-
eral courts have applied the Livonia Road principles. The fourth
section analyzes Connecticut v. Doehr,10 the United States Su-
preme Court case which extended the prejudgment attachment
due process protection of Fuentes to real property. Finally, section
five analyzes the government's argument which opposes the appli-
cation of Livonia Road.
II. THE CIVIL FORFEITURE SANCTION
The sanction of civil forfeiture supplements criminal penalties.
This sanction has been defined as the government taking of private
vided for a search warrant under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."
5. To date, research has revealed only two Montana forfeiture cases at the Supreme
Court level, both of which involved personal property issues. State v. 1978 LTD II, 216
Mont. 401, 701 P.2d 1365 (1985); State v. Baker, 205 Mont. 244, 667 P.2d 416 (1983).
6. See Gregory W. Weircioch, Note, Eviction Without Conviction: Public Housing
Leasehold Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. Section 881, 48 WASH & LEE L. REv. 1409, 1413 n.15
(1991).
7. See, e.g., State v. Valley, 1992 WL 5402 (Mont. 1992); State v. Rydberg, 778 P.2d
902, 239 Mont. 70 (1989).
8. 889 F.2d 1258 (2d Cir. 1989).
9. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
10. 111 S. Ct. 2105, 2113 (1991).
1993]
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property, illegally used or obtained, without compensation."
One purpose of civil forfeiture statutes is to strip those who
sell or process controlled substances of their operating tools and
economic base, thereby making it more difficult for them to con-
tinue their illegal activity.12 Civil forfeiture is exclusively a civil
sanction, and the government may proceed without a criminal
conviction. 13
Both the federal drug forfeiture statute14 and Montana's civil
forfeiture statute allow for the seizure and forfeiture of (1) vehi-
cles 5 , (2) money and other forms of proceeds" and (3) real es-
tate.1 7 The Montana Supreme Court has decided only a few civil
forfeiture cases, all of which dealt with the forfeiture of personal
property.1 8 In deciding these cases, the court has relied on federal
law.' Therefore, in interpreting sections 44-12-101 to -206, it is ap-
propriate to look to the federal courts for guidance.
Civil forfeiture is intended to be a harsh sanction for those
who process or distribute illegal narcotics.20 In addition to suffer-
ing criminal sanctions, the drug dealer faces the prospect of losing
large quantities of personal and real property. 21 In order to seize a
vehicle, the government need only show that the vehicle was "used
or intended for use" in any manner to facilitate the commission of
a violation of "offenses involving dangerous drugs. 2 2 According to
one court's interpretation of "facilitate" a vehicle owner faces for-
feiture if the owner so much as plans to use the vehicle to commit
a controlled substance violation.23 The Montana forfeiture victim
fares no better with personal property under sections 44-12-101
11. United States v. Eight Rhodesian Stone Statues, 449 F. Supp. 193, 195 n.1 (C.D.
Cal. 1978).
12. See, e.g., Caplin and Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
13. See, e.g., United States v. One Clipper Bow Ketch Nisku, 548 F.2d 8 (1st Cir.
1977).
14. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
15. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-12-102(1)(d) (1991).
16. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-12-102(I)(g) (1991).
17. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-12-102(1)(i) (1991).
18. See, e.g., State v. 1978 LTD II, 216 Mont. 401, 701 P.2d 1365 (1985); State v.
Baker, 205 Mont. 244, 667 P.2d 416 (1983).
19. 1978 LTD II, 216 Mont. at 403, 701 P.2d at 1368; Baker, 205 Mont. at 246, 667
P.2d at 418.
20. United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, Described as Lot 4, Block 5 of the
Eaton Acres, 712 F. Supp. 810, 813 (D. Or. 1989).
21. Criminal prosecution, however, is not a prerequisite to forfeiture.
22. MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-12-102(1)(d) (1991). See MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 45, ch. 9
(1991) (listing offenses involving dangerous drugs).
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to -206; the law recognizes a presumption of forfeiture.2'
Section 44-12-102(1)(i), 25 the real property section of Mon-
tana's civil forfeiture statute, is a result of the 1989 amendments to
sections 44-12-101 to -2062' and was patterned after 21 U.S.C. §
881.27 By including real property in the forfeiture statute, the
Montana Legislature adopted the same sanction as the federal gov-
ernment and the states of Washington,28 Idaho,2" and Oregon."0
Including a real property forfeiture provision in the statute
significantly increases the severity of the consequences for the al-
leged wrongdoers and their families. This addition extends the im-
pact of civil forfeiture to family members who can also be physi-
cally removed from the wrongdoer's home when seizure occurs.3
24. MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-12-203(1) (1991).
25. MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-12-102(1)(i) (1991) provides that:
[Rleal property, including any right, title, and interest in any lot or tract of land
and any appurtenances or improvements, that is directly used or intended to be
used in any manner or part to commit or facilitate the commission of or that is
derived from or maintained by the proceeds resulting from a violation of Title 45,
Chapter 9, that is punishable by more than 5 years in prison. An owner's interest
in real property is not subject to forfeit by reason of any act or omission unless it
is proved that the act or omission was the owner's or was with his actual knowl-
edge or express consent ...
26. 1989 MONT. LAWS § 2 ch. 652.
27. 21 U.S.C § 881(a)(7) (1981 & Supp. 1992) provides that:
[AJIl real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold
interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or im-
provements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to com-
mit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this punishable by more than
one year's imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omis-
sion established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the
knowledge or consent of that owner.
28. WASH. REv. CODE § 69.50.505(a)(8) (1989).
29. IDAHO CODE § 37-2744 (1992).
30. 1989 OR. LAWS 791.
31. Section 44-12-102(1)(i) allows that "an owner's interest in real property is not sub-
ject to forfeit by reason of any act or omission unless it is proved that the act or omission
was the owner's or was with his actual knowledge or express consent .... " This is substan-
tially the same language as contained in the "innocent owner" defense at § 21 U.S.C.
881(a)(6). While this may appear to protect spouses and families, the practical reality is that
when fifty percent of a family's equity in real estate is forfeited, and (as is often the case)
the family head is incarcerated, the family is effectively removed from the property. Usually
the family is unable to maintain payments. Additionally the family must deal with the state
who now owns half of the property. Although section 44-12-102(1)(i) has this protective
language, it does not make specific reference to the property rights of innocent spouses, nor
does it specify what constitutes "actual knowledge." It does not indicate whether construc-
tive knowledge will suffice. A wife who knows of her husband's controlled substance activi-
ties yet strongly disapproves, will be faced with a dilemma under section 44-12-102(I)(i);
either she reports his activity, which will lead to prosecution or she does nothing which will
result in the forfeiture of her interest in the property as well. Such a choice for an otherwise
innocent spouse is no choice at all. See Derrick Wilson, Drug Asset Forfeiture: In the War
5
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Section 44-12-102(1)(i) does not differentiate between innocent
family members and the wrongdoer.
An examination of section 44-12-102(1)(i) to -206 reveals that,
while the legislature added real property to the statute, the legisla-
ture failed to add procedural safeguards providing for preseizure
notice to the'landowner. Section 44-12-103(2) establishes the crite-
ria for when property is subject to forfeiture and may be
seized-criteria currently existing for execution of search
warrants.3 2
Arguably then, under section 44-12-102(1)(i), as under 21
U.S.C. § 881, families can be ejected from their homes based upon
law enforcement's ex parte showing of probable cause.13 The possi-
bility of people being removed from their land without preseizure
notice and hearing raises the serious question of whether section
44-12-102(1)(i) can withstand constitutional challenge.
A review of sections 44-12-101 to -206 and 21 U.S.C § 881
shows substantially the same wording. Montana courts have, in
fact, cited to federal precedent in cases interpreting personal prop-
erty issues in sections 44-12-101 to -206."' First," Second,3"
Third,37 and Ninth" Circuit Courts of Appeal, as well as District
Courts within the Fourth," Sixth40 and Seventh 41 Circuits, inter-
on Drugs is the Innocent Spouse the Loser?, 30 J. FAM. L. 135-37, 139-49 (1992); Beverly L.
Jacklin, Annotation, Who is Exempt From Forfeiture of Real Property Under "Innocent
Owner" Provisions of 21 U.S.C.S. § 881(a)(7)?, 110 A.L.R FED. 569, 598-605 (1992).
32. MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-12-103(2) (1991) provides that: "All property subject to
forfeiture under 44-12-102 may be seized by a peace officer under a search warrant issued by
a district court having jurisdiction over the property."
33. The federal counterpart of section 44-12-101 to -206 of the Montana Code is 21
U.S.C. § 881. This section provides:
Any property subject to civil forfeiture to the United States under this title may
be seized by the Attorney General upon process issued pursuant to the Supple-
mental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims by any district court of
the United States having jurisdiction over the property .... The Government may
request the issuance of a warrant authorizing the seizure of property subject to
forfeiture under this section in the same manner as provided for a search warrant
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
34. State v. 1978 LTD II, 216 Mont. 401, 404, 701 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1985); State v.
Baker, 205 Mont. 244, 252-53, 667 P.2d 416, 420 (1983).
35. In re Kingsley, 802 F.2d 571, 580-83 (1st Cir. 1986) (Coffin, J., concurring and
Torruella, J., dissenting).
36. United States v. Premises and Real Property at 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d
1258, 1265 (2d Cir. 1989).
37. United States v. Parcel of Land, Bldgs., Appurtenances and Improvements,
Known as 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d 98, 101 (3d Cir. 1991).
38. United States v. James Daniel Good Property, 971 F.2d 1376, 1383-84 (9th Cir.
1992).
39. Richmond Tenants Org., Inc. v. Kemp, 753 F. Supp. 607, 609 (E.D. Va. 1990).
6
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preting the provisions of the Federal Statute 21 U.S.C. § 881, have
recognized that an ex parte seizure of real property without
preseizure notice to the landowner could violate due process. In
each of these cases the government had obtained ex parte, a war-
rant allowing for the seizure of property. That procedure was later
found to be inadequate to satisfy due process. These courts have
used the case of United States v. The Premises and Real Property
at 4492 South Livonia Road as their foundational holding.42 There,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that an ex parte seizure
of real estate violated due process. 3
Although there are legitimate arguments that these procedures
do not violate due process,' 4 current authority at the federal level
overwhelmingly finds a due process violation.4 1 The federal prece-
dent of Livonia Road and subsequent cases suggest that section
44-12-102(i) is unconstitutional as applied.
III. LivoNIA ROAD. A DUE PROCESS VIOLATION IN GOVERNMENT
REAL PROPERTY SEIZURES
In 1989, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Livonia Road
was confronted for the first time with the question of whether the
due process clause favors the homeowner or the government when
the property seized is a private residence.46 At issue was the bal-
ance between an individual's right to occupy his home and the gov-
ernment's efforts to curtail drug selling from residences in urban
areas.47 In Livonia Road the court held that the ex parte seizure of
a residence, without notice to the homeowner and opportunity for
a preseizure adversarial hearing, violated due process.48 The court
40. United States v. 14128 S. Sch. St., Riverdale, Ill., 774 F. Supp. 475, 478-80 (N.D.
Ill. 1991); United States v. Property at 850 S. Maple, Ann Arbor, Mich., 743 F. Supp. 505,
509-10 (E.D. Mich. 1990); United States v. Parcel I Beginning at a Stake, 731 F. Supp. 1348,
1353-54 (S.D. Ill. 1990).
41. United States v. Certain Real Property Located on Hanson Brook, Town House
Rd., 770 F. Supp. 722, 728-30 (D. Me. 1991); United States v. Two Parcels of Property
Located at 185 and 191 Whalley Ave., New Haven, Conn., 774 F. Supp. 87, 89-91 (D. Conn.
1991).
42. 889 F.2d 1258 (2d Cir. 1989).
43. Id. at 1265, 1266.
44. See Recent Development, Fifth Amendment-Seizures and Forfeiture of Prop-
erty-Federal Court Upholds Preseizure Notice and Forfeiture of Real Property Used for
Narcotic Trafficking. United States v. 141 Street Corp., (2d Cir. 1990), 104 HARv. L. REV.
1139-46 (1991).
45. Weircioch, supra note 6, at 1413 n.15. See also supra notes 35-41 and accompany-
ing text.
46. 889 F.2d at 1263.
47. Id. at 1265-66.
48. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988)).
19931
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found that, as a general rule, absent an "extraordinary situation"
that justifies postponing notice and opportunity for hearing, due
process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the
deprivation of a property interest."9 Curiously, the court relied on
three personal property cases in justifying its analysis:5" Fuentes v.
Shevin,5 1 Goldberg v. Kelly,52 and Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.
5 3
The "extraordinary situation" exception to Livonia Road's
due process requirement comes from Fuentes.4 The exception ap-
plies when three criteria have been met:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to se-
cure an important governmental or general public interest. Sec-
ond, there has been a special need for a very prompt action.
Third, the State has kept strict control over its monopoly of legit-
imate force; the person initiating the seizure has been a govern-
mental official responsible for determining, under the standards
of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in
the particular instance."
The requirement that only an "extraordinary situation" can
justify the failure to provide a preseizure hearing applies even in
the context of a civil in rem personal property forfeiture proceed-
ings. 6 In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., the Su-
preme Court applied the three Fuentes criteria to the seizure of a
pleasure yacht pursuant to a Puerto Rican drug forfeiture stat-
ute.5 7 The Court held that "this case presents an 'extraordinary'
situation in which postponement of notice and hearing until after
seizure did not deny due process"58 because the second Fuentes
criterion" had been met:
Preseizure notice and hearing might frustrate the interests served
by the statutes since the property seized-as here, a yacht-will
often be of a sort that could be removed to another jurisdiction,
destroyed, or concealed, if advance warning of confiscation were
given. 59
49. Id. at 1263.
50. Id.
51. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
52. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
53. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
54. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 81-82.
55. Id. at 91.
56. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
57. Id. at 679-80.
58. Id.
59. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679.
[Vol. 54
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The court in Livonia Road applied the federal forfeiture stat-
ute to the facts and found that two basic constitutional principles
were implicated. 0 First, notice and an opportunity for hearing, as
required by Fuentes, should generally precede the taking of an in-
dividual's property.6 1 Second, an individual's expectation of pri-
vacy and freedom from governmental intrusion in the home merits
special constitutional protection.2 The court then held that:
[T]he constitutional adequacy of the pre-seizure ex parte proce-
dure afforded the homeowner turned on the balancing of three
considerations: (1) the significance of the property interest at
stake; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation through the proce-
dures used and the probable value of additional procedural safe-
guards; and (3) the government's interest in pre-seizure notice,
including the avoidance of burdensome additional procedures.62
The Livonia Road court next turned to the ultimate question
of whether the due process balance favors the homeowner or the
government where the property seized is a residence."' The court
analyzed whether sufficient exigent circumstances existed to war-
rant postponing notice and the opportunity for an adversarial
hearing.65 The court ruled in favor of the homeowner and held that
"[a]s a general matter, a showing of exigent circumstances seems
unlikely when a person's home is at stake, since, unlike some forms
of property, a home cannot be readily moved or dissipated. 6 6 In
Livonia Road we see the first in a series of modern cases that finds
in favor of the homeowner by requiring notice and opportunity to
be heard before a government seizure can take place. Livonia Road
set the standard for subsequent cases by extending the due process
analysis of Fuentes to government seizures of real property.
IV. FEDERAL COURTS FOLLOW THE LIVONIA ROAD APPROACH
The majority of federal circuit courts that have considered the
issues raised in Livonia Road have followed its reasoning and con-
cluded that the seizure of real property without preseizure notice
and hearing violates fundamental fairness and due process of law. 7
60. Livonia Road, 889 F.2d at 1264 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988)).
61. Id.
62. Id. See generally United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573 (1980); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
63. Livonia Road, 889 F.2d at 1264 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35
(1976)).
64. Id. at 1265.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 937 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1991), cert.
1993]
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Most recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v. James Daniel Good Property adopted the Livonia Road
due process analysis, holding that the federal forfeiture statute re-
quires notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the seizure of
real property: 8
[The homeowner] has a substantial and unique interest in his
home. The government's interest in avoiding a pre-seizure hear-
ing is not significant in this case. The house is not going any-
where. It is not going to be 'removed to another jurisdiction, de-
stroyed or concealed.' Any legitimate interest the government has
may be protected through means less restrictive than seizure....
The government does have a strong interest in seeing that the
property is no longer used for illegal purposes, but this interest
can be met through means less drastic than seizure of the real
property. On the facts of this case we find that the statute [21
U.S.C. § 8811, as applied, violated... [defendant's] rights to due
process.6 9
Numerous United States District Courts that have considered
the forfeiture issue in the context of the federal forfeiture statute
have followed an analysis similar to Livonia Road and reached the
same conclusion. 70 In a case of first impression in the Seventh Cir-
cuit, the court in United States v. Parcel I recently held that the
ex parte seizure of real property violates due process. 71 The court
applied the three factor analysis set forth in Mathews v. El-
dridge,72 and noted the "unique interests" persons hold in their
homes. The court further stated:
Most importantly, the governmental interest in providing mini-
granted on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 17 (1992); United States v. James Daniel Good Prop-
erty, 971 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1992). See also In re Kingsley, 802 F.2d 571 (1st Cir. 1986) (a
case pre-dating Livonia Road, where the court stated that due process requires more than
an ex parte probable cause review by a judicial officer). The majority in Kingsley concluded
that the government must make the following three showings in an ex parte proceeding: (1)
that there exists probable cause to seize the property; (2) that pre-seizure notice to inter-
ested parties would be likely to render the property unavailable for forfeiture; and (3) that
less restrictive means, i.e., bond, restraining order, or lis pendens, will not suffice to protect
the government's interest. Id. at 571 n.32.
68. James Daniel Good Property, 971 F.2d at 1384.
69. Id. (citation omitted).
70. See, e.g., United States v. 14128 S. Sch. St., 774 F. Supp. 475 (N.D. Ill. 1991);
United States v. Hanson Brook, Town House Road, 770 F. Supp. 722 (D. Me. 1991); United
States v. 185 and 191 Whalley Ave., 774 F. Supp. 87 (D. Conn. 1991); Richmond Tenants
Org. v. Kemp 753 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. Va. 1990); United States v. 850 S. Maple, 743 F. Supp.
505 (E.D. Mich. 1990); United States v. Parcel I, 731 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D. Ill. 1990).
71. United States v. Parcel I, 731 F. Supp. 1348, 1353-54 (S.D. Ill. 1990) (citing 21
U.S.C. § 881 (1988)).
72. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). See also Livonia Road, 889 F.2d at 1264.
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mal due process is, in the balance, scant when compared with the
claimants' overriding interest in their homes. ... The government
interest in foregoing burdensome proceedings will not be ad-
vanced since the claimants can, and did, invoke adversary proce-
dures after seizure. Furthermore, the claimants' homes cannot be
readily dissipated or concealed and, in any event, the governmen-
tal interest can be adequately protected by the filing of a lis
pendens. Also, the government has not demonstrated to the
[c]ourt that it feared the claimants' homes would be used to fur-
ther facilitate drug activity.7 3
In both Richmond Tenants Organization v. Kemp, and
United States v. 850 South Maple, the courts extended the Livo-
nia Road analysis to the civil forfeiture of tenancies in public hous-
ing.74 In Richmond Tenants and 850 South Maple, federal forfei-
ture proceedings were initiated against the tenancies of residents
of public housing projects.75 In these cases, the government ob-
tained writs of entry based upon ex parte representations to an
independent magistrate, and used them as a basis to evict the te-
nants.7 ' The court in Richmond Tenants adopted an analysis simi-
lar to Livonia Road and commented on the distinction between
homes and other forms of property:
[Niumerous courts have determined that homes are distinctly dif-
ferent legal entities in the property forfeiture context. Unlike
cars, yachts, and airplanes, more typical examples of property
confiscated in order to prevent continued drug activity, a home is
immobile, and thus not likely to be hidden or moved after notice.
Consequently, "exigent circumstances could virtually never exist
which required the seizure of a home prior to notice and a
hearing."7
Likewise, in 850 South Maple, the federal district court held that
the seizure of a home, without prior notice and hearing, violated
the constitutional right of due process. 78
73. Parcel 1, 731 F. Supp. at 1354 (citations omitted).
74. Richmond Tenants, 753 F. Supp. at 609; 850 S. Maple, 743 F. Supp. at 509.
75. In both of these cases the tenants were suspected of dealing drugs from their pub-
lic housing project apartments. As part of the National Public Housing Asset Forfeiture
Project, which allows for the forfeiture of leaseholds pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), both
federal and local housing authorities sought to eradicate the high incidence of drug-related
crime in public housing projects.
76. Richmond Tenants, 753 F. Supp. at 610; 850 S. Maple, 743 F. Supp. at 508.
77. Richmond Tenants, 753 F.Supp. at 609 (quoting 850 S. Maple, 743 F. Supp. at
510) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
78. 850 S. Maple, 743 F. Supp. at 510 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988)). See also United
States v. 14128 S. Sch. St., 774 F. Supp. 475 (N.D. Ill. 1991); United States v. Hanson
Brook, 770 F. Supp. 722 (D. Me. 1991) (applying Livonia Road analysis to commercial real
1993]
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The cases following Livonia Road show a trend at the federal
level extending due process protections to landowners in civil for-
feiture cases. The question thus remains: was the reliance by these
courts on the personal property analysis in Fuentes justified and
can Fuentes legitimately be extended to real property seizures ini-
tiated by the government?
V. CONNECTICUT V. DoEHR: FUENTES EXTENDED To REAL
PROPERTY
A weakness in the Livonia Road decision and the cases that
followed was the court's extension of personal property attachment
concepts to real property. The Court in Fuentes did not address
the question of whether its holding extended to real property. For-
tunately, that question was recently decided by the United States
Supreme Court in Connecticut v. Doehr.79
In Doehr the Court reaffirmed that absent exigent circum-
stances, a plaintiff's interest in encumbering real property is not
sufficient to justify burdening the owner's property rights without
notice and an opportunity to be heard.80 The Court used the three-
fold analysis established in Mathews v. Eldridge when examining
the constitutionality of Connecticut's prejudgment attachment
statute.8 1 The Connecticut statute permitted prejudgment attach-
ment of real estate without prior notice or an opportunity to be
heard.82 The provision authorized attachment upon a party's ex
parte showing of probable cause to sustain the validity of the
plaintiff's claim, and it did not require a showing of extraordinary
circumstances.8 3 The Supreme Court held that the statute was un-
constitutional because "by failing to provide a pre-attachment
hearing without at least requiring a showing of some exigent cir-
cumstance, [the statute] clearly falls short of the demands of due
process." '84
The Court in Doehr first noted the nature of the owner's
interests:
[T]he property interests that attachment affects are significant.
For a property owner .... attachment ordinarily clouds title; im-
pairs the ability to sell or otherwise alienate the property; taints
estate).
79. 111 S.Ct 2105 (1991).
80. Id. at 2115.
81. Id. at 2112. See supra note 63, at 1264 and accompanying text.
82. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. at 2110.
83. Id. at 2111.
84. Id. at 2116.
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any credit rating; reduces the chances of obtaining a home equity
loan or additional mortgage; and can even place an existing mort-
gage in technical default where there is an insecurity clause. 5
The Court then rejected the government's contention that the lack
of a hearing was justified because the deprivation was neither total
nor permanent:
The Court has never held that only such extreme deprivations
trigger due process concern. To the contrary, our cases show that
even the temporary or partial impairments to property rights that
attachments, liens, and similar encumbrances entail are sufficient
to merit due process protection. Without doubt, state procedures
for creating and enforcing attachments, as with liens, 'are subject
to the strictures of due process.'8 6
Finally, the Court turned to the "risk of erroneous depriva-
tion" factor and distinguished its earlier decision allowing a
lienholder to have disputed goods sequestered:
Unlike determining the existence of a debt or delinquent pay-
ments, the issue does not concern 'ordinarily uncomplicated mat-
ters that lend themselves to documentary proof.' The likelihood
of error that results illustrates that 'fairness can rarely be ob-
tained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of
rights .... [And n]o better instrument has been devised for arriv-
ing at truth then to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss no-
tice of the case against him and an opportunity to meet it'. . . . It
is true that a later hearing might negate the presence of probable
cause, but this would not cure the temporary deprivation that an
earlier hearing might have prevented. 'The Fourteenth Amend-
ment draws no bright lines around three-day, 10-day or 50-day
deprivations of property. Any significant taking of property by
the State is within the purview of the Due Process Clause'.7
Doehr shows a clear directive from the United States Supreme
Court that in matters of real property attachment the rights of
homeowners in their property are so great that even the slightest
deprivation will constitute a significant taking under the Due Pro-
cess Clause.
VI. THE GOVERNMENT'S ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF Ex PARTE
SEIZURE OF REAL PROPERTY
To prospectively examine Montana's position on the constitu-
85. Id. at 2112-13.
86. Id. at 2113 (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 2114-15 (citations omitted).
19931
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tionality of section 44-12-102 (1)(i) of the Montana Code requires
an analysis of Livonia Road and its reliance on Fuentes. The hold-
ing in Fuentes is a "narrow one," 88 involving a state replevin stat-
ute where a private citizen invoked governmental power to replevy
goods. The holding in Fuentes is based on a Fifth Amendment
analysis as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In Montana the government will argue that, in relying on
Fuentes, Livonia Road erred in applying a Fifth Amendment anal-
ysis to a Fourth Amendment seizure."
Law enforcement seizures traditionally have not been gov-
erned by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, but rather by
the Fourth Amendment search and seizure clause. 0 The Court in
Fuentes expressly distinguished a seizure under a search warrant
from a seizure under a writ of replevin, on grounds that: (1) a
search warrant is generally issued to serve important governmental
needs and is "issued in situations demanding prompt action"; and
(2) that the Fourth Amendment guarantees that the government
will not relinquish control over the seized property to private par-
ties and that a warrant will not issue except upon probable cause."
The Fourth Amendment expressly governs seizures of prop-
erty and provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."9 2 The Fourth Amendment makes no distinction between
real and personal property, nor does it mandate a hearing or the
payment of just compensation.9
A Fourth Amendment warrant empowers the government to
seize property to further law enforcement purposes, not to advance
the private interests of civil litigants, as was the case in Fuentes.9 4
Because the Fourth Amendment expressly regulates the seizure of
property for law enforcement purposes, the Fourth Amendment,
rather than the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, determines
88. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972).
89. The Fourth Amendment expressly governs seizures of property and provides that
"no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
90. See generally Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); Brower v. County of Inyo,
489 U.S. 593 (1989). See also Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1404-09 (7th Cir.
1985)(Easterbrook, Circuit Judge, concurring).
91. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 93-94 n.30. See also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 (1974).
92. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
93. Id.
94. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 93 n.30.
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the process applicable to a seizure initiated by the government. 5
Indeed, to effect the seizure of a person, the government need only
satisfy Fourth Amendment requirements.9 In United States v.
Monsanto, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a pre-trial
order in a criminal case that barred the defendant from transfer-
ring his property (including a home and an apartment) prior to
trial. 97 The Court held that "assets in a defendant's possession
may be restrained in the way they were here based on a finding of
probable cause to believe that the assets are forfeitable."98 The
Court further explained that it had "previously permitted the Gov-
ernment to seize property based on a finding of probable cause to
believe that the property will ultimately be proved forfeitable. 99
The Court noted:
[W]here respondent was not ousted from his property, but merely
restrained from disposing of it, the governmental intrusion was
even less severe than those permitted by our prior decisions. In-
deed it would be odd to conclude that the Government may not
restrain property, such as the home and apartment in respon-
dent's possession, based on a finding of probable cause, when we
have held that (under appropriate circumstances), the Govern-
ment may restrain persons where there is a finding of probable
cause to believe that the accused has committed a serious
offense.'00
The government could further argue that a seizure of real
property in which the government merely takes constructive cus-
tody of the premises without eviction is less intrusive than a
seizure of personal property in which the owner is entirely de-
prived of its use and the property remains in the government's cus-
tody. Yet the Supreme Court agrees that in the later situation the
Constitution does not require a prior hearing.10 1 The seizure of real
property through constructive custody, in contrast, involves no
more than filing a complaint and notice of lis pendens, posting no-
tice, and conducting a quick survey of the property-or procedure,
considerably less intrusive than the physical seizure and removal of
95. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 387 (holding that the Fourth Amendment, rather than
substantive due process, is the source of limitations on use of force in seizing an individual).
96. United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
97. Id. at 611.
98. Id. at 615.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 614-15.
101. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679-80; United States v. $8,850.00 in U.S. Currency,
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a person or personal property."0 2 In United States v. $8,850.00 in
United States Currency,'0 the Court expressly observed:
[A]bsent an extraordinary situation a party cannot invoke the
power of the state to seize a person's property without a prior
judicial determination that a seizure is justified. But we have pre-
viously held that such an extraordinary situation exists when the
government seizes items subject to forfeiture.1
0 4
In United States v. Von Neumann,'06 the Court also acknowledged
that "[d]ue process does not require federal customs officials to
conduct a hearing before seizing items subject to forfeiture." ' Al-
though the decisions in $8,850.00 and Von Neumann involve assets
that could easily be moved or dissipated in value (money and a
car), this fact was not mentioned in either opinion. Further, the
Eleventh Circuit construed the Court's statement as suggesting
that pre-seizure notice and hearing are never required in the forfei-
ture context. 107
The government's argument might be persuasive, but it ig-
nores a well established principle of forfeiture law: forfeiture exists
exclusively as a civil remedial action. 0 8 As such, an analysis that
civil seizures should be considered Fourth Amendment seizures be-
cause they involve law enforcement creates a distinction without a
difference. The Fuentes Fifth Amendment criteria, by virtue of its
civil remedial quality, must apply to civil seizures. Therefore, the
government's argument referring to the narrow scope of Fuentes
must necessarily fail because of the Doehr holding that in matters
of real property attachment the rights of homeowners in their
property are so great that the slightest deprivation constitutes a
significant taking requiring due process.109
102. Richmond Tenants Org. v. Kemp, 956 F.2d 1300, 1306-07 -(4th Cir. 1992) (citing
Livonia Road with approval and holding that the summary eviction of tenants from seized
public housing units violates due process).
103. 461 U.S. 555 (1983).
104. Id. at 562 n.12 (citations omitted).
105. 474 U.S. 242 (1986).
106. Id. at 249 n.7.
107. United States v. Single Family Residence and Real Property Located at 900 Rio
Vista Blvd., Fort Lauderdale, 803 F.2d 625, 632 (11th Cir. 1986).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980); United States. v. One 1972
Toyota Mark II, 505 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1974).
109. The government may argue that contrary authority undermines this thesis. In a
case decided after Livonia Road, the Second Circuit in United States v. 141st Street Corp.,
911 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1990) held in a commercial property seizure that land owners were
afforded sufficient due process by the ex parte warrant procedure allowed under federal law.
This holding, at first blush, seemed in startling contrast to the Second Circuit's holding in
Livonia Road approximately one year before. While acknowledging that real estate seizures
normally require notice, the court argued that in this case "an important government inter-
[Vol. 54
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VII. ANALYZING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MONTANA
FORFEITURE STATUTE
The constitutionality of Montana's Forfeiture statute, section
44-12-102(1)(i), may in large part turn on whether the law affords
greater protection to real property than to personal property. As a
general rule, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be
heard prior to the deprivation of a property interest110 in the ab-
sence of an extraordinary situation that justifies postponing notice
and opportunity for hearing.111 The United States Supreme Court
found that circumstances meeting the three Fuentes' criteria indi-
est justified postponing notice until after the initial deprivation." Id. at 874. The court dis-
tinguished 141st Street Corp. from Livonia Road. As it had in Livonia Road, the court
applied the three-prong test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). Initially,
the court emphasized that the claimant had a diminished private interest because it owned
the building for "solely commercial purposes" rather than for residential purposes. Id. at
875. In holding that an ex parte procedure afforded sufficient due process the court indi-
cated that "a commercial interest ... traditionally has not occupied the same privileged
place as the home." Id. In acknowledging the governmental interest in curtailing drug activ-
ities, the Second Circuit focused on whether there existed exigent circumstances, as set
forth in Fuentes, which justify postponing the opportunity for an adversarial hearing. After
identifying the obvious governmental interest in curtailing drug activity the court found
that the "rampant" drug activity in the 141st Street Corporation property required prompt
action. The court found the third prong of the Fuentes test satisfied by the magistrate's ex
parte finding of probable cause. Id. at 875.
141st Street Corp., however, clearly is distinguishable from Livonia Road and section
44-12-102(1)(i). 141st Street Corp. concerns a recognized exception to Fuentes-exigent cir-
cumstances. The government may attempt to use 141st Street Corp. to distinguish commer-
cial from more protected residential real estate. However, in 141st Street Corp. exigent cir-
cumstances required prompt action. Arguably, absent these exigent circumstances the court
would not have treated this commercial property differently than the residential property in
Livonia Road.
In Tellevik v. Real Property Known As 31641 West Rutherford Street, 838 P.2d 111
(Wash. App. 1992) the Washington Supreme Court addressed the ex parte due process issue
under Washington's civil forfeiture statute. The court found that the ex parte warrant pro-
cedure used (essentially the same as the federal procedure) did not violate due process. Id.
at 120. The court applied the principles of Fuentes and held that due process requires a
hearing prior to a deprivation. Id. at 117. The court further determined that an ex parte
presentation of a seizure warrant constituted such a hearing and thereby satisfied due pro-
cess requirements. Id. Critical to the court's holding was the Washington statute which al-
lowed claimants a full adversarial hearing no later than 90 days from the date of seizure. Id.
(citing R.C.W. 69.50.505(e) (1989)). The Washington statute as interpreted by the Tellevik
court differs from section 44-12-102(1)(i) of the Montana Code which does not afford a full
adversarial hearing within 90 days of seizure. The Tellevik holding is problematic for claim-
ant's counsel and will no doubt be relied upon by government counsel. The court in Tellevik
distinguished Livonia Road and the federal cases that followed it simply by stating that
those cases incorrectly applied the principles of Fuentes and Mathews v. Eldridge. Id. at
119. Tellevik clearly represents the minority view.
110. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
111. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90.
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cate an extraordinary situation.112 Further, the Supreme Court has
held that the principles of Fuentes apply to personal property
seizures as well."1 Personal property seizures are distinguishable
solely because they fall within one of the Fuentes' exceptions, for
example "prompt action." ''1 In cases of real property forfeiture,
however, the need for prompt action does not typically exist. The
filing of a notice of lis pendens would likely restrain the landowner
from transferring the property.
As in Livonia Road, there are two main constitutional princi-
ples implied in section 44-12-102(1)(i) of the Montana Code. Those
principles are procedural due process before seizure, and the
heightened constitutional protections persons are normally af-
forded in their home.
11 5
With these fundamental constitutional principles in mind, the
conclusion that section 44-12-102(1)(i) is unconstitutional is ines-
capable. Section 44-12-103(2)(d) provides for the ex parte seizure
of land pursuant to the provisions of Montana's search and seizure
statutes.1 To determine the constitutional adequacy of section
44-12-102(1)(i), a court must weigh the three considerations of
112. Id. at 91.
113. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 (1974).
114. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90.
115. U.S. CONST. amend. V. A number of cases have addressed the issue of a citizen's
heightened level of constitutional protection within the home. In G.M. Leasing Corp v.
United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977), the Court distinguished warrantless searches of
automobiles from warrantless searches of private offices, holding that the latter were enti-
tled to a higher level of privacy requiring a warrant. The Court also said that "[o]ne gov-
erning principle justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been fol-
lowed: Except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search warrant of private
property without proper consent is unreasonable unless it has been authorized by a valid
search warrant." Id. at 353-54 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-529
(1967)).
In U.S. v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 422 (2d Cir. 1978), the court spoke to the higher level of
constitutional protections afforded a homeowner under the Fourth Amendment. In address-
ing this higher level of protection the court stated "the sanctity of private dwellings [is]
ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protections .... [Pirivate dwell-
ings involve strong Fourth Amendment interests that justify the warrant requirement ... 
Id. at 422 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuentes, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)).
In United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), the Court was confronted with the war-
rantless monitoring of a beeper in a private residence not available for visual surveillance. In
ruling that this minimal intrusion still violated the homeowner's expectation of privacy, the
Court said "searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unrea-
sonable absent exigent circumstances .... Id. at 714-15.
See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) (stating "[t]he Fourth Amend-
ment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy
more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an
individual's home."); Livonia Road, 889 F.2d at 1264 (stating that "it is clear that a home is
entitled to special due process safeguards when targeted for civil forfeiture.").
116. MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 46, ch. 5 (1991).
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Mathews v. Eldridge: 7 First, the significance of the property in-
terest at stake; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
through the procedures used and the probable value of additional
procedural safeguards; and third, the government's interest in pre-
notice seizure including the avoidance of burdensome additional
procedures.' 18 Applying the Mathews criteria to section 44-12-
102(1)(i) shows that absent the exigent circumstances referred to
in Fuentes the government's interests could be satisfied by the fil-
ing of a notice of lis pendens. Absent a showing of exigency the
due process balance must favor the homeowner.11 9
The government's most persuasive argument would be that
civil forfeiture is a Fourth and not a Fifth Amendment seizure.'20
The weight of federal authority, however, rejects that position. The
argument that the absence of a federal eviction statute separates
state from federal forfeiture is logical but not compelling.'"' The
federal cases focus on the Fuentes' criteria and not on the due pro-
cess aspects of eviction. An analysis of the current federal and
United States Supreme Court cases leads to only one conclusion: a
citizen's interest in his or her real property requires special protec-
tion. The very terms of section 44-12-102(d) reinforce this notion
and allow for a presumption of forfeiture in all property except
real property, where it appears that the government has the bur-
den of proof.' 22 Perhaps the most persuasive guidance comes from
the United States Supreme Court in Connecticut v. Doehr. Prior
to Doehr, whether the due process protections of Fuentes should
be extended to real property was in question. In interpreting 21
U.S.C. § 881 (1989), the federal courts relied upon Fuentes in de-
ciding that landowners are entitled to preseizure notice. Yet in do-
ing so, these courts were relying on a case that by its very terms
did not apply to real property. This left open the argument that
Fuentes does not apply to real property issues. By extending the
Fuentes protections to pre-judgement attachment of real estate,
the Court in Doehr definitively answered that question. The Doehr
decision, therefore, is persuasive and telling in that it shows a clear
intent by the United States Supreme Court that even the slightest
real property deprivation requires due process.
117. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
118. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335.
119. Livonia.Road, 889 F.2d at 1263.
120. See, e.g., U.S. v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 265 (1989).
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-12-203(1) (1991).
1993]
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Since 1990, federal courts have unanimously held that real
property civil forfeiture interests are entitled to greater due pro-
cess protections than personal property. 123 In doing so, these courts
have recognized that real property in general and homes in partic-
ular are entitled to special due process protections. They have rec-
ognized that the need for "prompt action" expressed in Fuentes
and implemented in Calero-Toledo does not exist in real property
forfeitures. Moreover, the filing of a notice of lis pendens will sat-
isfy that consideration by restraining the land owner from trans-
ferring the property. In allowing for the seizure of real property
without preseizure notice to the land owner, section 44-12-102(1)(i)
is contrary to existing federal precedent as well as the notion of
fundamental fairness to land owners. Although the Montana Su-
preme Court must ultimately decide whether section 44-12-
102(1)(i) is unconstitutional as applied, there does exist a strong
argument, supported by federal precedent, that the real property
portion of the Montana civil forfeiture statute is unconstitutional.
123. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text. See also Recent Development,
supra note 44, at 1141-43; Weircioch, supra note 45, at 1413 n.15.
[Vol. 54
20
Montana Law Review, Vol. 54 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/4
